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DEREGULATION: THE C.A.B. AND ITS CRITICS
ROBERT L. THORNTON*
I. INTRODUCTION
The enhanced possibility that Congress would rewrite the Fed-
eral aviation regulatory law persuaded the board of editors of the
Journal of Air Law and Commerce to devote its entire Autumn
1975 issue to a symposium discussing the logic of proposed changes
to the Federal Aviation acts. The highly informative issue stated
the positions of the various parties and suggested reasons why
change was either necessary or inappropriate depending on the
viewpoint of the different authors.
This article is intended first to add some political dimensions to
the debate and considerations which will explain some of the differ-
ences of opinion aired at the symposium. The political dimensions
will provide some background for an evaluation of the logic which
underlies the different positions. The second purpose of this article
is to identify certain arguments which are manifestly "public rela-
tions positions" rather than real positions and other postures which,
although superficially attractive, need to be analyzed carefully.
II. REASONS FOR THE ENHANCED PROBABILITY OF CHANGE
The Civil Aviation Acts of 1938 and of 1958 have been ex-
tremely stable pieces of legislation. While there have been periodic
demands for change by groups within the United States,' with
minor exceptions, these demands had been ignored. Without strong
* B.A., University of Akron; M.B.A., Ph.D., University of Michigan; Chair-
man and Professor of Marketing at Miami University, Oxford, Ohio; member,
International Air Transport Association Project "Think Tank"; former Professor
of International Business at Florida State University.
1See, e.g., G. EADs, THE LOCAL SERVICE AIRLINE EXPERIMENT (1972); F.
THAYER, AIR TRANSPORT POLICY AND NATIONAL SECURITY (1965); KEELER, AIR-
LINE REGULATION AND MARKET PERFORMANCE; Bell, J. ECON. & MANAGEMENT
ScI. 399 (1972).
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evidence of consumer dissatisfaction or significant lobbyist pressure
for change, political realists had accepted as fact that important
changes to the basic law were highly unlikely. This static situation,
however, has changed remarkably over the past two or three years.
There are several reasons for the greater probability that a reform
act might be passed. Briefly stated, these can be identified as fol-
lows: first, the 1973 cancellation of youth fares; second, the de-
velopment of excess capacity within the airlines; third, the intro-
duction into the governmental power structure of a new face, the
Department of Transportation. I will amplify each of these de-
velopments to show why they are important.
Ever since the young, well-educated, and highly mobile segment
of the American population discovered their political power, they
have been vigorous change agents. The group is unusually power-
ful not only because of its numbers but also because it is well-
educated and accustomed to questioning accepted modes. The
power of the group has increased because it has a high success
rate. This group quickened the U.S. departure from Vietnam, was
a prime mover behind the drive for racial equality, and spear-
headed the consumerist and environmentalist movements which
have changed the world of the 1970's.
During the late 1960's the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB)
authorized discount fares for youth.' These fares proved extremely
attractive to the powerful youth segment, not only on domestic
routes, but perhaps more importantly, on international routes as
well. Many of the influential members of the group developed a
strong taste for travel and a desire to view and review customs and
cultures in other parts of the world. This habit of travel, while cer-
tainly not universal among youth, became an important status
symbol to the better educated, the more thoughtful, and the weal-
thier students. The 1972 decision by the CAB to cancel these
youth fares stopped this movement abruptly.3 The excuses given
to the grounded youths did not seem, superficially at least, to make
sense. The stated reasons for banning the student fares-that they
were discriminations against persons rather than conditions of
travel-was hard to accept in view of the probability that those
2 See American Proposes 50% Youth Jet Fare, Av. WEEK & SPACE TEC.,
Dec. 20, 1965, at 30.
3 C.A.B. Order No. 72-12-18 (Dec. 5, 1972).
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discirminated against were no worse off with the youth fares than
they would have been without them. It was not easy to explain
why half-empty airplanes could not be filled at cheap fares by
students who would not travel at higher fares. This group, in pro-
test, followed the successful strategy they had used in previous
causes. They started heavy agitation in the press, with members
of Congress, and in influence groups throughout the United States
to demand changes in the means of regulating civil aeronautics.'
The group is too powerful to ignore and normally will get change
of some kind. Whether the change will be major or minor is not
certain, but the young have too much political power to be easily
frustrated by the opposing forces.
Amplifying the student unrest caused by the abrupt cancellation
of a prized perquisite was the concurrent development of a heavy
dose of overcapacity within the industry.' This overcapacity re-
sulted from the introduction of wide-bodied jets. Although the
academic critics like to say that this overcapacity was an evidence
of bad management by airline executives,' it is difficult to see how
it could have been avoided. The new wide-bodied jets, highly
attractive to passengers, would have been able to steal passengers
from competing narrow-bodied jets. In addition, their operating
characteristics enabled them to make money at much lower load
factors than the jets with which they competed. It is reasonable to
assert that any major privately owned airline which did not invest in
wide-bodied jets would have found it difficult to stay on many routes
during the introductory phase of the wide-bodied jets. It is easy to
say retrospectively that over-ordering of aircraft need not have oc-
curred, but the problem was clearly predicted and recognized as in-
evitable by several students of the industry at the time the jets
were being ordered.! With the availability of wide-bodied jets able
4 See Editorial Commentary Aeroflot Caper, Barrons, Aug. 6, 1976 at 7, col. 1.
Among those testifying for change in CAB during the Senate Subcommittee hear-
ings on Civil Aeronautics Board Practices and Procedures, in the 94th Congress
(Feb.-March 1975) were Ralph Nader and representatives of Consumers Union.
3 Overcapacity was most evident in long range segments. Pan American, for
example, was forced to reduce utilization of Boeing 747 aircraft from 10 hrs.
43 minutes per day in 1973 to 9 hrs. 29 minutes in 1974, a loss of 9.4%. PAN
AMERICAN AIRWAYS, ANNUAL REPORT XII (1976).
'See, e.g., Miller, A Perspective on Airline Regulatory Reform, 41 J. AIR
L. & COM. 679, 691 (1975).
'Sir William Hildred, Director-General of the International Air Transporta-
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to operate profitably at low load factors, naturally complaints arose
suggesting that the accompanying empty seats represented a waste
of resources, particularly of fuel when the OPEC oil crisis erupted.'
Something was obviously wrong, and the arguments seemed per-
suasive.
A third factor enhancing the probability of regulatory change
was the establishment of the Department of Transportation. Prior
to the establishment of the Department of Transportation, the CAB
had developed a modus operandi with other organizations within
the government. Although it was technically an arm of the Con-
gress, it had relatively few differences of opinion with the executive
department. There were necessarily heavy overlaps between the De-
partment of State and the CAB when international routes were being
considered, yet the CAB came close to being an absolute dictator
of domestic air policy, unchallenged by other government agencies.!
The Department of Transportation was established in the late
1960's to consolidate transport matters into one department of the
executive. The Department of Transportation obviously would
come into head-on conflict with the CAB insofar as air transport
was concerned. It is not surprising that officials of the Department
of Transportation felt that it had primary policy responsibility for
air transport." Since the CAB already possessed near-absolute
power in this field, a collision was inevitable. Early skirmishes in
the conflict between the two agencies were lost by the Transporta-
tion Department,1' perhaps because it still lacked the necessary
resources, policies, and long service personnel to mount an effec-
tion Association, warned, "[T]his [Jumbo Jets] could mean the unleashing of in-
credible capacity that would make our past overcapacity problems appear pathetic
by comparison." Annual Report of the Director General, 33 INT'L AIR TRANSP.
Bull. 53, 74 (1965). See also R. THORNTON, INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES AND POLI-
Tics 157 (1970).
8 See ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 154 (1975).
9See Miller, A Perspective on Airline Regulatory Reform, 41 J. AIR L. &
CoM. 679, 682 (1975).
10 See Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Dec. 22, 1969, at 28.
11 Included in these early engagements was an attempt to become coordinator
of Policy for the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal Maritime Com-
mission, and the Civil Aeronautics Board. A more serious defeat resulted when
the Transportation Department attempted to dominate the development of Presi-
dent Nixon's 1969 International Air Transport Policy, a battle won by the De-
partment of State. Transportation Department Role to Spur Federal Conflicts,
Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Sept. 29, 1969, at 31.
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tive intra-government war; perhaps, also, because the Department
of Transportation chose to fight some of its early skirmishes in the
international segment where the CAB and the Department of State
had an impregnable position. As the Department of Transportation
gained expertise, however, it also sought out allies in other govern-
mental agencies. It found them particularly in the Department of
Justice and in the Council of Economic Advisors." The results of
the major continuing struggle between these agencies have been
to weaken the established positions of all the traditional groups
and to reduce the unity which had once existed among regulators.
The CAB, recognizing the new substantially improved quality
of its opposition, was hurried into making some decisions which
have made it quite vulnerable to criticism. The presence of unused
capacity and of a vocal youth group added to the pressure which
hastened the CAB into its decisions. The most important of these
decisions resulted from the Domestic Passenger Fare Investigation
(DPFI). As a result of the DPFI, the CAB gave away much of
its traditional flexibility in fare setting.
The CAB had been criticized because fares between cities equi-
distance apart had varied and because this variance was difficult to
explain. In an attempt to protect itself from the severe criticism,
the CAB in its 1974 DPFI adopted a rate formula (a fixed charge
plus a standard rate per mile) which would minimize such fare
anomalies. 3 It subsequently became obvious that there were many
reasons why nonmilage based fare differences were logical and
that the "equal fare for equal distance" rule was a force for pre-
venting innovative pricing. Among the reasons were differing costs
on different routes due to density, operating difficulties, and differ-
ing demand elasticity which made price differentiation more or
less successful in maintaining satisfactory load factors. It is un-
likely that the CAB would have given away its traditional flexibility
in fare setting had it not been defending itself against criticism.
A second example which gave critics a basis for objection was
12 James C. Miller III served as theoretician and spokesman for the Council
of Economic Advisors. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Prac-
tices and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975). Thomas E. Kauper served as spokesman for the Antitrust Division, De-
partment of Justice. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
Is C.A.B. Order No. 74-3-82 (Mar. 18, 1974).
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the informal decision by the Board to place a moratorium on all
new route awards rather than acting through formal procedures."
The decision to stop new awards might have been justified as a
policy (most routes were considered "over competition"), but the
manner in which it was done permitted outsiders to complain,
plausibly enough, of unfairness."
III. CRITICISMS-WHEAT AND CHAFF
The Journal of Air Law and Commerce, symposium provides a
set of criticisms of the regulatory system as well as a second set
of opposing opinions which favor the status quo. As is to be ex-
pected in an environment in which political action is an important
objective, the criticisms and opinions are of varying quality. Some
are outright absurdities. Some are half-truths or propositions which
need supporting evidence. Others are defensible statements. It is
worthwhile breaking down some of them to place the criticisms
and opinions into one of the above categories.
A. Some Absurdities.
The most obvious set of absurdities are those which criticize
the airline for providing unnecessary amenities on flights. Among
those mentioned as unnecessary amenities are the following:
The airplanes are painted a wide collection of gaudy colors. 6
The airplanes could theoretically be left aluminum colored but it
is foolish to presume that unregulated airlines would not paint
their airplanes. Once the decision to paint has been made it costs
no more to paint an airplane purple or pink that it does to paint
it dark blue or gray.
The airlines are criticized for having attractive stewardesses."
The stewardesses are required for safety reasons and for control
of passengers in flight.1 ' Once stewardesses are required for safety
14 See Kennedy, Airline Regulation by the Civil Aeronautics Board, 41 J. AIR
L. & CoM. 607, 616 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Kennedy].
15 "Outsiders" included the airlines who were not permitted new award be-
cause of the delay; for example, World Airlines' Transcontinental application
(1967); North Central Airlines' Detroit-Boston application (1972).
1" Snow, Aviation Regulation: A Time for Change, 41 J. Am L. & COM. 637,
642 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Snow]. See also, Miller, A Perspective on Airline
Regulatory Reform,41 J. AIR L. & COM. 679, 685 (1975).
17Snow, supra note 16, at 642.
1" Letter from the Federal Aviation Authority to the author (Feb. 15, 1977).
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reasons there is no reason why they should not be attractive.
The airlines are criticized for providing free drinks.' There have
been rare instances where alcoholic beverages have been provided
without cost to coach customers. In the vast majority of cases,
however, the only free drinks provided coach customers are four
ounces of soft drink. Any other drink is normally paid for by the
customer at a price which, given the necessity of a stewardess for
other reasons, is probably economically justified. If the free drinks
objected to are the four ounces of soft drink, the criticism ap-
proaches the absurd.
The airlines are criticized for lavish meals." The meals provided
have, on very rare occasions, been of unusually high quality,
usually exotic sea food or steak, but these have been of extremely
limited duration. The meal provided on most flights, including
those on competitive routes, is attractive and reasonably palatable,
but a long way from lavish.1 This criticism is intended to suggest
that the consuming public would be better served if they bought
their tickets without a meal included and meals were provided at
an added cost. While this proposition is superficially attractive,
there are major administrative problems with it. First, if free meals
were not provided at times, when meals are taken by custom, the
airlines would have difficulty in preventing customers from "brown-
bagging" their meals. "Brown-bagging" a meal represents a major
problem both in interference by one passenger with another and
in clean-up and control of waste resulting from the meal. If a meal
were not provided for free, one passenger who wished the airline
meal might be sitting beside another passenger eating a brown-
bagged meal which created a nuisance and a mess which would be
difficult for the stewardess to clean up.
The provision of a "no added cost meal" may be essential if
the airlines are to prevent highly unsatisfactory meal arrangements.
Consumers who doubt the truth of this statement should observe
transportation facilities in which meals are not provided. The
procedure to prevent fouling the passenger bus compartment with
11 Snow, supra note 16, at 642.
20 Kennedy, supra note 14, at 610.
21 "The average cost per passenger for food is $3.12," according to Howard
D. Putnam, Group Vice President, Marketing, United Airlines. Advertising Age,
Sept. 13, 1976, at 6, col. 5.
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garbage and obnoxious odors is to make appropriate stops where
meals may be taken or where "brown bag" lunches may be eaten
outside the passenger compartment. This, of course, is not appro-
priate for airlines. In Europe, where trains are much more heavily
used and where people of limited means are commonly accommo-
dated, "brown bagging" is normal, and the result for many people
is revolting. It should be noted that even in circumstances where
price cutting is a primary selling tool, such as charter flights and in
other non-regulated circumstances, a meal is almost universally
furnished free. This criticism will not stand inspection. It is super-
ficially attractive, but upon examination it is administratively and
economically irrational.
The biased nature of many of the above criticisms is most easily
brought out by examining the unregulated situation, referred to
throughout the symposium as the example of the way things ought
to be done or would be done in the absence of regulation. These
examples are Pacific Southwest Airlines and Southwest Airlines. The
provision of some of those things criticized as being a result of regu-
lation has become the trademark of both Pacific Southwest Airlines
and Southwest Airlines." The sexiest stewardesses in the business
are said to belong to Pacific Southwest Airlines; their uniforms are
unquestionably the most exotic.' Southwest Airlines is notable for
the gaudy painting of its airplane,' and both airlines are in the
forefront of the move for trendy decorations not only of the
stewardesses but of the airplanes as well.'" Neither provide meals,
but then neither do certain of the regulated carriers at comparable
flight distances."
22 See Gottschalk, High Flyers Fall, Wall St. J., July 20, 1976, at 1, col. 8.
2" The President of Pacific Southwest Airlines decked out P.S.A. stewardesses
in pink, orange, and red hot pants outfits. Id. at 31, col. 3.
24 "Hi. It's Us, Southwest Airlines. Us with our brand new, candy colored
rainbow powered Boeing 737 Jets." Telephone greetings to callers (June 10-18,
1971).
""He (President of Pacific Southwest Airlines) painted widely grinning
mouths under the noses of P.S.A. planes." Gottschalk, High Flyers Fall, Wall St.
J., July 20, 1976, at 31, col. 3.
2 Industry practice varies depending on the total routing of a flight. Pied-
mont Airlines, with similar route distances generally limits service to snacks;
Pacific Southwest Airlines, however, also serves snacks. See appropriate Official
Airline Guides.
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B. Propositions Needing Supporting Evidence.
Several propositions made by contributors to the Journal of Air
Law and Commerce symposium need more evaluation before they
can be accepted as valid. Some propositions of contributors are
well-criticized by other contributors. For example, the airline
apologists fear the abandonment of small city service without regula-
tion,"7 critics of regulation adequately discuss the weaknesses of
the airline proposition,' and the "abandonment" argument gets a
reasonably balanced treatment. Certain other propositions, how-
ever, are stated by contributors but are not fully critiqued by other
participants.
Perhaps the most superficially persuasive argument used against
regulation is that without regulation fares would be driven down
by competition to the point at which no more than a normal
profit would be possible. Since regulated airlines do not and have
not averaged more than a normal profit,2 this argument needs the
support of an ancillary theorem, namely that airlines voluntarily
reduce their profits to an unreasonably low point through over-
scheduling. An airline obsessed by "share of market" objectives
adds unneeded capacity to a route until it is making below accept-
able profits. At this point the regulators bail out the airline through
fare increases, proceeds from which are used to add capacity, re-
starting the cycle. Presumably, this would not happen without
regulation. Unregulated airlines, knowing they would not be bailed
out, would only schedule enough capacity to insure adequate serv-
ice. Some critics represent this amount as load factors of sixty to
seventy percent; that is, averaging sixty to seventy seats occupied
out of every hundred available.
In spite of a sprinkling of comments about relative managerial
efficiency between regulated and unregulated airlines, the basis of
the "price reduction" argument for deregulation lies almost exclu-
27 See, e.g., Rasenberger, Deregulation and Local Airline Service-An Assess-
ment of Risks, 41 J. AIR L. & CoM. 843 (1975).
28 See Snow, supra note 16, at 660-62.
29 Since 1968, domestic trunks have averaged well below "all manufacturing
organizations" in "return on equity." They have not approached the CAB rec-
ommended "Return on Investment" since 1967. Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Aviation of the House Comm. on Public Works and Transportation, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
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sively in load factor."° Load factor problems, therefore, need to be
reviewed at some length. Before discussing load factors, however,
it is important to put the under-use of available capacity exempli-
fied by low load factors into perspective. Unused capacity is wide-
spread in the United States in unregulated industry. It is not
necessarily regulation which produces low utilization. It can be a
variety of things. Your local supermarket, so busy on Friday even-
ing, is near empty on Tuesday morning. Ski lifts stand idle and
silent in August, and Carolina Beach is visited principally by sea
gulls in February. Your friendly local barber works at top speed
Friday night, but spends Monday morning gazing out his shop
window. The correlation between unused capacity and regulation
is highly imperfect.
1. Low Load Factors.
Low load factors are caused by several considerations. Most
importantly, load factors are affected by demand variability. De-
mand varies in several patterns, each idiosyncratic to particular
markets. The first variable is seasonal. Across the North Atlantic,
for example, February demand is only one third of August de-
mand. 1 Few people go to Europe for pleasure in February. People
will not go to an undesirable place for pleasure at any price, so
price reductions do not help much.
The second problem is weekly variation. Most business routes
are travelled heavily on Friday and Sunday, with half as many
customers on Wednesdays. What do we do on Wednesdays if per-
sonal travel is unimportant to the route?
A third problem is directional imbalance. In tourist markets,
for example, everyone flies south in early winter and back in late
winter, or before and after holidays. If so, presuming we have
taken a load in one direction, how do we get the airplane back to
the "from which" point to pick up a new load of "to whiches"?
Repositioning can be done only at very low load factors.
The last problem is that of "no shows." Outsiders are frequently
unaware of the severity of the "no show" problem. For example, a
major airline station manager at Tallahassee, Florida, stated to the
author that one of every four reservations he receives becomes a
30 Kennedy, supra note 14, at 621.
"1Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Aug. 29, 1977, at 30; id., Nov. 28, 1977, at 24.
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"no show." This factor alone would make the absolute maximum
load factor seventy-five percent, before corrective action. "No
shows" are normally willful acts, done by an individual, unsure of
the time his business will let him leave a city, who safeguards two
or three different times by separate reservations. Of course, he is
a "no show" on all the nonused times. Corrective airline action is
by "overbooking," a risky practice complained of by Senator Ken-
nedy's subcommittee in one symposium paragraph;3 not, however,
the same one as that in which it castigates the airlines for low
load factors.'
Critics of regulation seem to suggest that load factor problems
resulting from poor matches between the size of an available air-
plane and the expected demand on a specified route are due to
regulation." The argument suggests, that the airlines have been un-
willing to demand certain sizes of aircraft, particularly the smaller
ones, from manufacturers. Presumably, without regulation, all com-
petitors would have a wide variety of aircraft types in each stable
and could choose the right one (as a craftsman chooses a tool) for
a particular route on a particular day. Presto, there would be no
scheduled overcapacity. This argument may be valid, but it does
raise credibility problems.
2. High Load Factors.
Given the above uncertainties, very high load factors are still
possible under particular circumstances.
Underscheduling: If the low point for demand is 100 per day
across a time period and the high is 200, schedule only 100 places
across the period. The peak travelers smooth out the high-low dis-
parity either by not going or by shifting their travel into valley
periods. This method is used in Europe where very high load fac-
tors (seventy-five percent) are commonly achieved.' This solution
is not practicable without regulation. Without regulation, competi-
tion would schedule preferred times, reinstating the peaks.
Matching cycles: If counter-cyclical demand can be developed
which reduces demand variability, load factors can be enhanced.
32 See Kennedy, supra note 14, at 631.
3, ld.
I See G. EADS, THE LOCAL SERVICE AIRLINE EXPERIMENT 129 (1972).
"'U.S. Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Economics, Recent Growth of
Air Traffic, Intra-European Compared to U.S. Domestic, Sept. 1971, at 8.
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The most attractive device would be discriminatory pricing, cheaper
for "low point" travelers, more expensive for peak ones. This could
be achieved either by lowering valley fares, by raising peak fares,
or by both. In this way, day-to-day demand would be smoothed
out and load factors improved. Practical usefulness of this ap-
proach depends on demand elasticities on a day-to-day basis.
Where tourism travel is important on a route, "within the week"
demand shifting is probably possible: from and to San Francisco,
Miami, New York, or New Orleans. When most travel is business-
oriented, extreme daily inelasticity is likely to frustrate the differ-
ential pricing approach. No unregulated airline will voluntarily
reduce prices into an inelastic zone on its demand curve (i.e., the
price reduction produces a total revenue less than that before the
price cut).
Variable scheduling: In this approach, daily flight schedules are
not symmetrical across a week or season. Only that which will be
used on a particular day is scheduled, and load factors are thus
high. Here, the most likely saving will come with seasonal varia-
tions, and this practice is widely followed even under regulation.
On a weekly basis, extra sections are frequently added for peaks
and omitted in valleys. It is a logical practice in all industry, how-
ever-regulated or unregulated-to operate capacity in the very
short run at any time that revenues are expected to cover variable
costs. On a "within a week" basis, a much larger percentage of
costs are fixed than is normally admitted to by academic theorists."6
Unregulated airlines, therefore, would be expected frequently to
do as poorly as their regulated brethren. They would fly at load
factors as low as twenty or thirty percent during short-term valleys
in demand, presuming severe demand variability exists.
Development of a differential advantage: This is perhaps the
approach most revelant to the discussion reported in the Journal
of Air Law and Commerce symposium. It does not change indus-
try load factors in a market; it merely shifts the burden of demand
variability from one carrier to another competing one. In this
approach, one carrier, by some device, becomes the carrier favored
"For a carrier to operate on a route, a certain minimum "presence" is im-
portant, and flights at least daily during the week need to be scheduled if their
services are to be successfully marketed. Theorists tend to ignore the importance
of this "presence" in calculating fixed costs.
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by most customers on a route. Customers will always take the
favored carrier when available. The favored carrier then schedules
only enough to serve all passengers wishing to fly at the lowest
demand period, abandoning the peak surpluses to its competitors.
If successful, the favored carrier can become extremely profitable,
flying at eighty or ninety percent full, and, if it wishes, further
exacerbating the problem for its competitors by using its increased
revenue to cut prices. Obviously, no carrier can afford to become
the victim of such a favored competitor; it would bear the entire
burden of demand variability. Much of the service competition
results from defensive moves to prevent a competitor from becom-
ing the most favored. Of course, the favored competitor cannot
afford to drive its competitors off the route; should that happen
the survivor will be reduced to dealing single-handedly with normal
demand variability again.
Considering the highly unfavorable results ensuing to any carrier
permitting a rival to develop a differential advantage, it would
seem that no company would allow it to happen. It has happened,
however, quite frequently, for a variety of reasons. Loftleider, the
Icelandic carrier, has long enjoyed differential advantage on the
North Atlantic. It maintains it through its ability to coerce the
United States into permitting it to be the only scheduled cut-rate
carrier on the route. The CAB permits rate cutting for external
reasons (the United States needs Iceland's military bases) and pro-
tects Loftleider's price differential by preventing other carriers from
violating the higher International Air Transport Association floor
prices."' Loftleider enjoys very high load factors, winter and sum-
mer, recession or boom, in a market nortorious for its cyclical and
seasonal variations. Laker Airways' North Atlantic "skytrain" pro-
posal and World Airways' low price transcontinental idea!' were
both feasible only if load factors could be kept high through dif-
ferential advantage. If potential competitors were wholly unfettered,
neither of them would seem to have any particular basis for dif-
ferential advantage. Without an advantage, the presuming com-
petitors matched their moves, they would have had to deal with
37 The author worked in NATO as a planner for three years, and is personally
aware of the very hard bargaining Iceland did on the subject of base rights.
s' Levine, Alternatives to Regulation: Competition in Air Transportation and
the Aviation Act of 1975, 41 J. Am L. & CoM. 703, 718-21 (1975).
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seasonal and cyclical variations of the same kind which prevent
current carriers from increasing load factors.
Differential advantage need not rest solely on price, although
price moves may be the initial cause of a differential advantage
which continues long after the price advantage has disappeared.
Pacific Southwest Airlines was permitted to build a "consumer
franchise" originally by price cutting. Their customers stayed loyal
long after price differences had disappeared. Consumers scheduled
with the competition only after Pacific Southwest was fully booked.
Southwest Airlines, the Texas intrastate carrier used (probably
accidentally) a different tactic to develop a successful "consumer
franchise." Their long legal battle to gain the "right to fly" against
entrenched regulated carriers was well-publicized. A sharp reduc-
tion in fares occurred on all carriers coincident with Southwest's
legal victory-applicable to all carriers." In the mind of the con-
sumer, however, Southwest Airlines was responsible for the price
cuts; they deserved the prized differential advantage."0
Another kind of basis for differential advantage could be used,
as an added example, if only one carrer was allowed to use a
highly favored airport. Imagine Eastern Airlines' Washington-based
load factor if only it could use Washington National Airport while
the competition had to use Dulles! Only if Eastern were full would
anyone call in the others.
A reasonable hypothesis can be made that a differential advan-
tage would be hard to achieve against alert, unregulated competi-
tors, and would be even harder to maintain. A loser in such a
situation would probably withdraw, destroying the favored carrier's
protection against traffic uncertainty.
"Unscheduled" schedules: One other theoretically attractive way
to achieve high load factors might be possible on extremely high
density routes such as Chicago-New York or Washington-New
39Fares prior to inauguration of services on June 18, 1973 by Southwest
Airlines: Dallas-Houston $27; Dallas-San Antonio $28. Fares afterwards: $20,
both city pairs. See Official Airline Guide, appropriate issues.
11 Southwest Airlines made certain that consumers knew who had started the
price war. A three page brochure on the theme "Remember what it was like be-
fore Southwest Airlines" was handed out in downtown streets of Dallas and Hous-
ton Feb. 1-5, 1973; the same theme was used in Dallas and Houston newspapers
on Feb. 5, 1973, along with copy such as "You'll lose if they win. If Braniff
succeeds you'll again be at the mercy of a single dominant airline on major Texas
routes."
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York. Presuming decisions to take off were made by airport
authorities rather than by airlines and were made only when the
airplane was full, the airport authority could see to it that 100 per-
cent load factors were achieved. Such a system would have to deal
with the businessman's desire for certainty-passengers might have
to wait appreciable periods of time for the last few fill-in customers.
On very high density routes, waits and uncertainty might be man-
ageable. On less dense routes, the scheme would probably be un-
acceptable.
A thoughtful evaluation of the above analysis of ways by which
high load factors might be achieved does not suggest that the
absence of regulation is a prerequisite for load factor efficiency. A
better prescription would have to be based on demand elasticity
conditions, or the presence of substantial personal travel interest
in the market in question. The most persuasive cases used by the
deregulators-the California and Texas cases-can be explained,
partially at least, as due to the presence of both regulated and un-
regulated carriers in the same market. The unregulated carriers use
differential advantage, stemming from unwise dependence on the
CAB by regulated airlines, to cream off the stable demand base,
while the regulated carriers are stuck with the cyclical excesses.
In both these cases the local experimenters were able to make
their deep fare cuts from concomitant reasons. They struck pay dirt
in an important pocket of demand elasticity."' Other unregulated
carriers have had less success; intrastate carriers in Florida, an-
other long, thin, populous state, have not been able to make an
impression, in spite of the California and Texas examples.' On
the other side, pay dirt was struck in spite of CAB regulation in
the Puerto Rico-New York markets. ' This pocket of elasticity was
"I Demand elasticity is defined as a market in which the increased volume
from price cuts will generate significantly more revenue after the cost of serving
the added passengers than the lower volume at higher fares produces.
,u The only current effort at emulating the Texas and California examples
is by Air Florida, which had not been profitable through 1975, and had suffered
a traffic decline 1974-75. At the time, it had 3 Lockheed Electras versus Pacific
Southwest's 30 aircraft. Air Florida was in the process of ordering different air-
craft at time of writing.
'See Prepared Statement of Rafael Hernandez-Colon, Governor of the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in "Oversight of Civil Aeronautics Board Prac-
tices and Procedures." Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice
and Procedure of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1975).
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exploited by the regulated carriers with effects quite similar to
those achieved in California and Texas-lower prices.
The most telling criticism of the CAB is of a recent innovation.
The "Formula Pricing" coming out of the Domestic Passenger Fare
Investigation inhibits the search for pockets of elasticity to which
the price cut tool should be applied. Formula pricing ignores vary-
ing elasticity situations. It will take an unregulated experimenter
to ferret out the pockets as long as formula pricing is a CAB
policy. The Puerto Rico pocket was discovered before "Formula
Pricing" was adopted as CAB policy.
3. Price Competition.
Load factors aside, the major premise of the assumption that
deregulation would result in lower prices is that an unregulated
airline industry would engage in vigorous price competition. The
theoretical basis for this assumption is arguable. An examination
of the nature of the airline industry suggests that in any relevant
market, it is totally unrealistic to presume that more than eight or
ten airlines would simultaneously offer service under free competi-
tion. In the vast majority of markets within the United States it
is highly unlikely that more than two or three airlines would be
viable at the same time on the same route. At this number of com-
petitors, economic theory does not support an assumption that
price competition would occur. The theory of oligopoly, instead,
would suggest that price competition would be the exception. The
statements made by the proponents of free competition in domestic
airline operation are generally made as if the market consisted of
an undifferentiated national market. At the operating level, that is,
the specific market (e.g., Birmingham-Atlanta), it is highly prob-
able that the scale of operations is always well below the minimum
cost point because of limitations on available demand. Arguments
denying this are based on overall operations rather than on opera-
tions in specific markets, and therefore are unrealistic.
Secondly, the assumption that because there are low fixed costs
in airline operations, freedom of entry is easy, is also suspect when
the market under consideration is recognized as being the local one
rather than the national one. For a new carrier to break into an
existing route will require a significant investment, primarily in
marketing, but also in station opening costs. Most studies of the
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cost of entry in airlines tend to be production-oriented and do
not recognize that the cost of reaching the market can be very
significant." A new competitor would have to displace an en-
trenched opponent before he could successfully invade a market.
If the logic behind this argument is to stand up, it would require
that the aggressor, a new carrier, be confident that he could recoup
the cost of entry into a market after he entered it successfully. If
we accept that prices will be kept down by fear of other new entries,
then this new competitor would not be able to make the excess
profit that is necessary to recoup the cost of entry. While the
circularity of both lines of reasoning is obvious, the price competi-
tion argument is not totally persuasive.
A glance at other unregulated industries where only a modest
number of competitors are involved provides us with some insight
into the competitive ways of an oligopoly. Automobile companies,
for example, do not compete with price. Instead, "bare bone
models" are neither available nor particularly sought after by the
public. Breakfast food manufacturers, an industry with low fixed
costs of production and superficially easy entry, are currently under
Federal Trade Commission attack for failure to price-compete."
In the motel trade, with far fewer entry problems, price competi-
tion has occurred in certain areas of the United States, the South-
east perhaps most obviously. It has occurred less obviously in most
markets. In supermarkets, rapidly degenerating into an oligopoly,
price competition is not the way to succeed, in spite of lurid price
ads in the newspapers. Indeed, potential supermarket profits are
more likely to be used, of necessity, in "trading up" the services
provided, an interesting parallel with the airline case.
Predicting the behavior of oligopolies has been an academic
nemesis for years. The academicians who have so confidentily
assumed that unregulated airlines would engage in price competi-
tion may be right, but likewise may be wrong. The most likely
result of total deregulation is one of a group of unexpected de-
velopments, one which would completely reorganize the industry.
There is a remote possibility that total deregulation would shift
"Included in the costs are terminal and gate space costs, local advertising
costs, promotion with local travel agents, minimum level of flights per city pair
per day, maintenance, servicing, and baggage handling services.
" See N.Y. Times, April 25, 1976, 5 3 at 1.
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power within the travel industry from the airlines to the travel
agents and wholesalers. The flying companies would be reduced
to mere subcontractors to powerful national travel agencies who
control the trade through controlling access to the market. In
Europe, for example, this has already occurred in the charter
market. There, one does not ride Dan Air or Monarch Airlines.
One rides with Cosmos Tours, or Thompson's Travel, or Cook's.
Dan Air or Monarch, technically airlines, are mere subcontractors.
IV. THE KEY CRITICISM OF REGULATION
The above discussion suggests that the critics of regulation have
failed to make their point. It is not established that the drastic step
of deregulation would offer advantages large enough or probable
enough to justify the risks involved. There is; however, one key
remaining criticism which is hard to deny and is damning of im-
portant segments of the regulatory system. Whether it is called
"overprotection of the scheduled routes" or "overconstraints on
charter travel," it amounts to the same thing. The CAB has pre-
vented the development of low cost, vacation-oriented, widely
attractive travel. For the traveling public, which will settle for in-
convenience to hold personal costs down, the alternative has not
been provided.
How Much Scheduled Travel?
Scheduled, dependable, and available air travel between locali-
ties is an important public need. It is the CAB's most basic charge
that it be provided. But, how much should be offered? What does
business need? Let me suggest. Business needs an available, short
notice, secure, and dependable flight between major cities usually
no more than three times per day-morning, perhaps noon, and
night. Once this frequency has been provided, and a high prob-
ability of short notice reservation guaranteed (say, ninety percent
two hours before), the public necessity has been met. Greater
frequency is not a need, it is a luxury. If a system could be de-
vised, for example, which would guarantee Chicago-New York
scheduled availability three times a day, the CAB should cease to
worry about the conditions under which any other passengers
travel. The CAB can make two kinds of error, Alpha and Beta.
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Alpha error is failing to insure adequate schedules to meet public
need. Beta error results from actions so protective of scheduled
travel as to inhibit the development of alternatives.
Until very recently, the CAB had been most fearful of making
an Alpha error. For the vast majority of markets within the United
States, protection of scheduled routes left no room for alternatives.
Demand was not adequate to go beyond three flights per day. For
the really large markets, however, those currently offering nearly
hourly flights, the CAB had until recently failed to try innovative
approaches which would permit the very great savings possible
with high load factors. Recently the CAB has been much more
relaxed in its control of price and conditions of service. Most of
the resulting new innovative approaches have called for signifi-
cantly lower prices with some modest form of capacity or timing
control on the low priced fare. Whether this experiment in meet-
ing the need for low cost fares within the framework of regulation
will succeed or not is at the moment difficult to predict. It is
worthy of note, however, that experimentation is possible without
deregulation and that deregulation is not a necessary prerequisite
to innovation. Indeed, as was suggested earlier and as European
experience has shown, strong regulation may be a requirement for
some innovative forms.
V. A SUMMARY
The Journal of Air Law and Commerce symposium did an
adequate job of making the point that the current regulatory sys-
tem was not providing all the results it should. Given that, it only
examined one way to solve the problem--deregulation. The sym-
posium did not persuade the thoughtful student that deregulation
would solve the problem. The problem remains, but because of
the heat which reregulation has generated, a solution by less drastic
means may not be adequately studied.

